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INTRODITaTIOH.
The words retros,ective

although

ans retroactive

literally

construed convey a diffevent meaning,

tei-chan

.ealy by t-,e courts in

which are made to op:erait,
wl ich exist, J

are use,

in-

rel'errinr to legislative acts

upon some subject,

before T-e r assage o.'

tion has been severely criticize

the act.

contract or crime
SIc

legisla-

by eminent authorities,

but there are cases in which laws may justly and for th-e benefit of the community and also of iniividuals relate to a
time antecedent

to th eir commencement.

which we shall deal with in

This is

ti-e class

this article.

Th.e Constitution of the United States provides
that no state shall Ilass any law impairing, the obligatious
of contracts or ex post facto law.
Two

These of course are

classes of retroactive laws that are exvressly Irohibitel

and all

such are therefore void.

of a retroactive nature

Put

as to all

other laws

the states have a perfect right to

enact provided they do not violate some other principle of
constitutional
the states,
in

law protecting vested ri;-hts.

however,

have seen fit

their constitutions,

of whatsoever nature.

Some of

to expressly prohibit

the passage of all

retroactive laws

Such is the case in the constitutions

of New Ilampsh-iire,

Ohio,

rPennuec,

Texas,

and perhaps

some

others.
CONSTRUCTIO7,4

!'T

'

-

'

'

'

..

Tn construing statutes

tIe

a prospective effect unless the
shall act retrospectively, is

courts always

legislative

exrressed

give thor

intent)that
in

they

clear and unam-

biguous terms, or such, intent is necessarily implied from
the language of the statute,

wh ich would be inoperative

ot}herwise than retrospecTively.
V

Johns 506,

the validity

able consideration

Tn Dash v. VanCluck,

of retrospective

anti the iudges

laws underwent

unanimously

agreed as

an

to

the propriety of construing a statute in prevention of
having a

retrospective

operation,

if

the court were not re-

strained by expressions explicit and. unequivocal.

This

doctrine is well sustained by modern authorities.

TYnowl-

ton v.

RedenbauTh,

40 Iowa,

of Tlizabe bi against HJill,

114.

Tn the

case of thie city

39 N.J.Law '565, Depew j. said:

uThe effort of the courts is always to give statutes a

prosrective effect only, unless tl-e language is so clear
and imperative as not to admit of doubt".

-ut when a

of oonstrlu-

has escaped the strictness

statute

retroactive

tion of the courts) as to

the in-tet of the logislature,

and does riot violate any constitutional 1 rohibition,

aniJ is

noT found contrary to tle fundramental princi]-les of 1he
isocial compact,

it

is

aboVe the province of the judicial
Accor-ing

department to say) that it shall not be a law.

to this fundamental principle of (;onstruction, statutes in
which the le;-islative intent is

expressed in

language so

broad in its literal extent as to comprehend existing eases,
will not be construed as embracing them unless such intenition
is

so clearly manifest as to remove all

such constr'uction is

necessary in

tive act any meaning whatever.

doubt,

or unless

order to give the legislaThis rule of construction

is applicable to state constitutions as well as to legislative acts,

and in fact to every conceivable expression of the

will of the law-making power)where there is a doubt qs to
whether it was intended to act prospectively or retrospectively.
3b'7.

Indiana County v. Agricultural Society, 8.- Pa. St.
'Put in

!:'Yigland where

tl ere are no constitutional

restrictions upon the legislative power,
whether an act of parliament

is

and the quostion

retrospective in

ints effect

is rurely one of construction, there seems
degree of reluctance on the part
the juirisdiction of the

of

to be a

g-reater

the courts to enlarge

law-makint power by ;,ivin;r statutes

a retrospective interpretation.
It is a unifoi-m doctrine in this country well settled by a lonp line of adjudicated cases

that the legisla-

ture is the sole judqe of the policy and wisdom of retroactive laws;

and tie courts have no right

clare a statute void simply becaus'e it
unless it

is

anId

de0-

is retroactive,

in open violation of existin- rights, the secur-

ity of which are guaranteed
v.

to interfere.

Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149;

by tT,,e constitution.
Cooley

Cont. Lim.

Welch
168.

ThYe underlying r~rincil-le of our jurisprudence is
justice and reason

Therefore, when laws of a retroactive

ch-aracter are just and reasonable they are invariably sustained by the courts) because there are numerous cases which
have arisen where it has been found to be absolutely necessary
to sustain laws of a retroactive character in order to render
anything in the nature of justije in that particular case
or to establish a reasonable precedent.
11 Tn determininq the vali'ity of a retroactive
law
the question resolves itself into the criterion whT,,V-r or

noz t!he act is an ex post facto law, a law impairing the obligation of a contract, or a law divestinr

Vheth-er

vested ri ,;hts.

,.he absence of any <enerai prohiibition in our con-

stitutions against T,,e distaLr)ance of irivate r'i;+ts, other
than those that are affected by
contracts, is to

impairin

be attributed to

the obligations of

the same cause wl'ich made

the Roman Law silent on the subject of parricide, because
it was not deemed wise to admit te possibility of such a
crime, or to an inherent difficulty in determining tlie just
limits of r'etroactive legislation, it is not
It is

easy to say.

certain among the restrictions fixed by the Constitu-

tion of the United States upon the states, there is none
which prevents the passage of retroslpective laws, however
unjust or impolitic excelt only wlere they would affect
existing contract6 or to attach to some previous act,

-h

penal consequences which it did not possess when committed.
Put of course nD man can be deprived of his property without
due p1rocess of law'and a right

to do a particular t1-ing has

been held by the courts to be a prolerty ri'?ht.

LAWf S AFFFCTT'":

RFPMDTS.

The first

great class

of valid retroactive

That may be considered are those that affect
ly.

In

Pact

this

class

constitutes

valid retroactive laws.
remedy in

a rarticular

disadvantageous
has no right

thJ

the g.'eater

Notwithstanding

laws
reiedy me'.]:-arT

of

the fact that The

case may be chanjged 1 and made more

to the

one seeking it,

to deny any remedy

the lerrislature

whatever.

A law may oper-

ate retrospectively by creating new remedies, by altering
or aholisT-hing old ones and substituting
such le,-islation does not
which the remedy was

new onesTrovided

substanti :liy impair the right

intended to enforce.

A person

cannot be deprived of The only remedy that he has to ,enforce a ri,-Tgt by any retroactiv,

I.w for

the reason that

such

an act would be clearly in violation of the constitution
by impairin.- CA*obligation or dejlrivin.'
with:out due process

of law.

T-e authorities

ally agreed that an individual h as a
on a contract notwithstandinp
been advanced, with great

one of his prol erty
have gener-

vested right

the fact that it has

in

a remedy
heretofore

force and eloquence that the rern, dy

could be destroyed without affecting the right.

In sur-rort

Daniel Webste.r once presen,ter]

of t}lis rrincil.le/

subtile

any sucl,

will not 6:tain

time,

At t},, present

logical argument.

making body destroy/s his remedy,

HoweVer,

it

courts

anrd the law-

such riht,

can

th(,

If a man

reasoning.

has a rig-ht and a remedy to enforce

an able and

be contended. for a

moment that his right is,also destroyed by th:e same overt
act of the legislature
what is

that destroys

his remedy?

a right, from a legal point of view,

caT.tble of beinr enforced bDy law?

For,

but a claim

And how is

he going to

enforce a claim without tlhe means or remedy to do so?
It has been laid down as a maxim, or rather a catchword
that "no one can have a vested right to a remedy".
however,

is

true only in

a limited sense,

and that is fthat

no one has a vested right to any particular remedy;
it

This

but

must be understood that a law which says that one shall

have no remedy to enforce an existing riht
impair the obligations of a contract.
remedy

or means must be left

to

enforce

would clearly
Some sufficient

th}e t} en existing

r i gh t.
The courts }'ave repeatedly sail th at -Tiere is
vested right

in

a remedy.

Put this statement is

no

g'enerally

qualified to the effect that the remedy cannot be so changed

as to render

it nugatory.

Ti1e rule regarding; remedies l.iid down by the
Supreme Court of' Pennsylvania
Second Sorg. (

F.

3t)8,

the case of Myers v.

establishing,

a I',roper limit

interference with remedies.

The court said:

"The remedy constitutes tle essential -art
ligation of the contract;
the contract itself

Irwin,

seems to be a just and equitable view

of this branch of the law,as
t;o legislative

in

)nor

of the legal ob-

but t.-e remedy is

not a rart

loes tle obligation of t 1-e

consist in any particular form of remedy.

of

contract

It is only nec-

essary that there should be an adequate subsisting remedy.
It

is

th:erefore believed

to change the remedy.

to be competent for* the legislature
If the remedy given be as good as

that which was taken away,

the contract is

The same view is

substantially

Supreme Court. In

rdwards v.

hold that t!,e remedy is
tract.

not impairel".

taken by the Inited States

Tearzey,

96 U.S.

9:5 it

was

a vital and material p art of the con-

A statute of fraur3s embracing pre-existin

contracts whiich were notlrrevious

toCAgenactment

to be in writinr ,would affect its validity.

parole
required

So also a

statute declaring that thie wordI "ton" should in T rior 16 well

as in subsequent contracts, be held to mean Thalf or double
the weight before prescribed,
previous
providin r

would materially

that a previous

would be null and

extinguished by a process of bankruptcy
void on the ground that

it

involved a
forbidding

A statute

the contract.

be obnoxious
trations

the

.Tut

or

impair the

the remedy that thiey vitally

of contracts.

courts

such laws comp letely

proceeding upon th e theory that all

obligations

ner

tl-

the

determined,

been judicially

so nearly destroyed

sale of any of a

te

The foregoing illus-

to a sta/Le government.

have all

comilete dischar~;e of

the remedy and

debtor's property would destroy

may be

of indebtedness

contract

statute

And a

be void.

and t!erefore

contracts

affect

class of statutes more

to be considered here are those that have been

particularly

declared valid.
It

is

with much

AL-haotic mass of cases,

lawAbe deduced from
in

conformity wit1

that any particular

all;

but it

is

that

practically

remedy to which a party is

the time the contact is

rule of

that a precise

difficulty

entered into,

Jviould be

safe to say:
entitled

may be altered

at
or abol.

ished by a subsequent statute, so that it will no longer be

availableIfor eitlher existing or subsequent
ded it

leaves a substantial remedy.

contractsprovi-

The great riffi-

culty in this class of cases is to determine whether the remedy

'as been altered or modifieri so as to materially alter

the obligation.

It is impossible to lay down any rule tirde:"
de-

which a large discretion of the courts cannot be used in
ciding each particuiar case) lax' ely on its own facts.
It

is

not easy to aprly a ri'-i1 rule for it

a very dif'fi-

is

cult task to determine wlfretl-er a rule of law in

a general

cla.:s of cases abrogates a mere srecial r,,medyor desT..'oys
a substantial one and thereby

impairs the very essence of the

obligation.
The remedy may be chianged,

revised,

and reformed,

and be render-d less expedient than tlhe one which the parties had in

contemplation when the contract was entered into,

Yet although a law may literally impair the enforcement
contract,

it

does not in

legal contemplation materially

of a
injur-j

nor impair the obligation of the contract/ so long as an
efficient
"It

remedy remains.

In

the language of Judge Cooley

has been held that law's clanging remedies for the

enforcement of legal contrcacts will be valid even thou]h

the

new remedy be less convenient

tlan the old,

or less prompt

The courts have hold that a judment

and speedy".

may be abolic hed and the judgment creditor can be left

lien
to

depend upon his other remedies a., ainst the judgment debtor;
and it
-ave

'as

also been geld that wv ere the charter of a bank

a sunmary reredy for the recove ry friom indorsers of

it

negotiable Tromissory notes,.. a different and piobably a more
expedient remedy

than an ordinary proceeding,

that it

was

subject to repeal.
Anot 1 'er case of retroactive

laws abolishing

ticular remedy wh7ic - has been repeatedly
courts,

is

in the case of abolishiny

. par-

sustained by the

imrrisonment for debt.

The theory upon which the court sustains this class of statutes)is t}hat imprisonment is a penalty for failure to perform
th-.e undertakingr,

and is

notApart of the contract itself.

They hold tbat the rigfht to imprison constitutes no part of
the contract,

and the discharge of the person of the

-arty

from imprisonment does not impair the obligation of the contract,

but leaves it in

effects.

full force against '-is rrop-rtu., and

LAWS AFF]TTTT PPO(jDIT'P'.

Laws relatinj, to proce-lure whic

have a reti'oactive

effect are generally held to be valid on the groud that
,eofislatures seem to have

they merely change the remedy.

considerable discretion in reard to substituting one mode
of action for anotlier in which the legal right;. oV t'he parties are enforced, that have accrued prior to such ch-anges
or legislative enactments, as viell as to subsequent ones.

It

is

generalLy concede,- by all

that the rules of plea-]in;:
lepislature

so lono as

it

authorities,

are witV-in the purview of the
is

merely regulating rrocedure.

exercised within the scope of
dif-

Laws which provide that

ferent parties may, or must be made parties to a suit,

or

requiring certain defenses to be pleade'1 slecially are
permitted to act retros ectively.

Also

statutes

-ivin-,

or taking away t he right of attachiment in certain actions
have been sustained, as affecting Trocedurre only, and applied
to

Tprior

causes of action.

And

statutes ch-langing the

manner in wh ich) sunmons may be served is valid as to past
transactions.

Tn fact

in all cases

it may be

laid down

that tl-:e rules+f

procelure in for-ce at the time of the

suit are tie ones tnat ,-overn.

The ri

to V-e legislature to re%-ulate legal

t

must be concede'l

roceeding s by general

laws as best tl'ey can for the administration of justice and
the public good.
h e early cases tlere -was some doubt as -b
In tl

whether <-e rules of v rocedur'e in force a; the time the
suit was comence-,
trial

should -overn;

or- those in foi',,e at the ti

e

of th e

but the later decisions confirm the

view that the law of procedure in force at the -time of The
trial must govern regardless of when the action was commenced.

Put it must be ke t in mind that any material

change of Trocedure that would absolutely de-rive a Iarty of
a remedy which he had at the creation of an obligation would
be void as impairing the obligation of the contract by comipletely destroying the remedy.

RTLES OF EVIDENCE.

Laws relating to the rules of evidence, relate
peculiarly to the remedy, therefore in accordance with the
view taken of statutes affectini the remedy by the courts,

it is a well-recognized 1-1rinciple tT-at tThc rules of evidence
may be chanf-ed by retrospective

statutes,

provided

tTat tle

thereby a cause of action is not destroyed or rerfdred
practically worthless.
ence to the manner

in

Rules of evidence may have referwhich

evidence

is

offereldor

it

may

refer to the competency of certain evidence to prove certain
facts.

qo long as the statute voes no furt]-er than to

regulate practiue in the courts, and does not
rights of parties,

impair the

it will operate upon past as well as fu-

ture transactionsand pending suits as well as those to be
instituted in the future.

The competency of a witness

in a civil suit is to be determined by the law as

it exists

at the time when he is called upon to testify regardless of
what may have been the rules at any previous time.
So also, are the rules of evidence regarding payers, documents etc. ,governed by laws in force at

The time of trial.

It is evident that this class of laws relate merely to the
form of the remedy and do not materially impair - Te rights
of any party.

A change of the rules of evidence is

g;enerally only a change of t}le means of accomplishing the
same end.

7XrIfP T TON LAWS.

So also, laws relating to exemptions in certain
cases are properly

remedy under

if

Zut

so groat as to render a

the amount of tze exemption is
creditor's

effect.

given a retroactive

a contract nugatory

courts will

the

not sus'tain such a law, because it essentially impairs a
right the protection of which- is
tion.

laws that

time

be repealed

with

the

military

as

by th-e state

at any

created

exemption laws do not

they will be

6uslained.

courts seems

to be to

laws

excelt

thorn,

as are

at any

contracts

impair

:lace

"There is

So

long

the oblig7ation of a contract

The later tendency of the
valid retroactive exemption
Judge Cooley remarks

no constitutional objection

]-roperty

exemption, nor to

to change by the

the legislature.

modification of those laws which
the debtor's

suc'h

time subject

into very narrow limits,

however,

constitu-

Statutes exempting certain persons from

service are
that

by the

exemrpt property from taxation can

state.

same power

guaranteed

exempt

from execution, as

to

such a

certain portions of
shall

increase

the

the modifications being made -aplicable to

contracts previously

entered into".

Cooley's Const. Lim.81.7.

This statement
witli

of Julge gooley's

the feneral

tren] of autl'ovities

but as Thas been said before

is

in

was written,

when it

to this
-dwards

statutes at the present time.

v.

IKearzey,

And in

proi'erty

from prior debTs are held to be invalid

str.itutes affecting

is

exemition of

impairing the obligations of contracts.

laid

re-a'Iless

imp.ossible for any law exempting property

from sale on execution to have a retroactive

view of this

9t) U.S.

91-e Missouri courts take the

of thieir scope or extent.
it

-3ecision6

clans of

b9'_.

view that

h'%,,rfmony

the obligations of con-

arplied much more strictly

Missouri

in

view of the later

impairing

the rule prohibiting laws
tracts

was undoubtedly

class

of cases,

down by Judge Cooley.

and is

effect 'without

This is

an extreme

the very opposite of that

Like all

other principles

of

law upon which widely varying positions are taken t1 -e
(thappy mear!'seems

to be the prevailing position taken by the

courts.
STAT1TES AROLISHING DFF,NSTS.

Statutory enactments taking away certain classes
of defense have been elaborately
esrecially

those relating

considered by the courts,

to the defense of usury and the

with a few

The general conclusion seems to be,

like.

sli ht variations, that the prevailino, current of authority
is

in

of such legisiation.

tlie constitutionality

favor of

0

any defense that

It seems that

is

tlhe nature of a penalty

in

infringing

can be obliterated by the legislature without
upon any

inherent

-onstitutionai

Usury laws

that prescribe a forfeiture

one of a legal remedy,
entered into

is

of such repeal

or deprive

for the reason that the contract

a usurious
is

right.

one may be rerealed.

to authorize

which when made were invalid

the

enforcement

The effect
of contracts

and unenforceable

under the

law as it existed at the time of such contract.
with this

class of cases,

the courts io

In dealing

on the theory that

a statute declaring,

that an antecedent usurious contract

shall not be void

not a law impair-ing

contracts,

is

but rathher one,

the object

force and obligation to contracts
its

passage.

There certainly

is

tle

obligation of

of which

to give

illegal and void Trior to
no obligation that

be impaired by a subsequent statute, in a void
And the

is

can

contract.

same concludion has been reached by the Courts

upon the ground that the forfeiture

of either

interest

or

lay

a

rate

but

it

is

who

is

to receive it.

of interest
in

in

excess of Th-at prescribed

eing a penalty it

of the obligation of the contract,
ject, of

, vested

right.

defense

of usury

is

and may be at
pect

party

taken

upon any vested
can have a

feiture,

vested

against

to relieve
highly

penal
always

in

or take
of the

their

case

i,

t},e

Curtis

v.

the

but arise

A pro

office

that

a

r enalty

of a

court

defense

res-

a
or for-

of equity

that
not

statutes
aprertaining

technical

law are constitutional and do not

of usury

defense,

of either
15 L1.Y.,

from some

in

Statutes of usury are

sanction

defenses

forfeiture,

osition

an unconscientious

rule

"The

says:

contracts, without

and the

Leviatt,

general

certain

1as

be the sub-

ler-islature

enforcing

character,

received

down as a
away

riTIhts.
in

Law,

forms no lartu

-enalty or

t°he

subsequent

legal solecism.

been regarded

or equity".
laid

it

of a

away by

ri

which

is a

and has never

be

time

the nature

to previous as well as

trenching

has

any

not can it

Mr. Justice Paige
in

by

imposed upon the p0arty

of a ] enalty

nature

th e

to

to a party w-o agrees

not a rifght guaranteed

is

Iprincijal

court

of law

Then

229.

it

may

which T:rohibit
to

the

merits

or oth er rule

impair vested rijhts.

of

LITTATTON LAWS.
Statutes which provide that no action shall be
maintained upon certain demands, unless suit be brought
within a limited time do not

generaily violate the consti-

tutional prolibition of laws imr2airin- the obli7ations of
contracts.

They merely modify the remedy and require a

party to bring his action within a certain time.

If he

neglects to prosecute his action within the time that the law
specifies,

truly it cannot be said that th-e law has worked

an injustice when the party by his own lalses has permitted

his cause of action to be determined by operation of law.
T1e law is

settled beyond a doubt that the mere fact that

the cause of action accrued prior to the enactment of the
statute will be no objection to tlhe limitation.

Solan v.

Watterson, 1/ Wall. 69b;

56i4.

Goai v. Zacher, l? Ohio,

The courts base their decisions on the groundl
policy, and ri,71htly Too.

of public

If the legislature did not I-ave

l-ower to enact reasonable limitation laws whic'

would cancel

stale demands, tl.ere would be no end to the multiplicity
of litigating obsolete demands.

In order to affect

xisting causes of action, there must be allowed a reasonable
time'after the statute goes into effect, within which such

action may be brought; but

it must be noticei that if tlne

legislatur',. shoul1 declare that a period already elaysed,
should bar a ri, ,.t of action This would be under coloi' of
reLulating arbitrarily a rule t'Pat would take away all remedy,
and in effect destroy ti

contract within its jurisdiction,

and would be a mere abuse of i owerwhich the constitution
permits no legislature to indulge.
If a right of action Ias been barred by the
statute of limitations," it is beyond PJe rower of the legislature to revive it,

for as has been said by an eminent

jurist

"sTatutes of 1mitation are st;-tutes of rep;ose".

Put

the time witiul arl faction may be extended at any time

before it is completely barred, eitler in resioct to civil
or criminal actions, is unlimited.
viding:

So also a statute -ro-

"That whiere any cause of action has been or shall be

obstructed by a war,

insurrection or rebellion,

the time tha,

such obstrucTLion may have continued sl-lall not be reckoned
as any part of the time in wlich

such right of action ou rIt

to have been prosecutel" Tas been Ield valid by t7-e courts.
The parties to a contract have no more a veste- rirht in
the time for the commencement of an action, than they have in

the form of the a.-tion to be commoced.
95 TT.S.

Perry

w.

Anderson,

3 ,8 .

LAWS VALTDATTNrI C
,'RTAIN C1ONTRACTS.

The instances of t',e exercise of leg-islative
authority to sujpjly former omissions and legalize rast acts,
have been necessary as well as just, an- the courts have
recognized the expediency of such legislation, and generally
give ii, their unqualified sanction.

In the language of

Judge Cooley "If the thing wanting, or" which failed to be done
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is
something which the legislature might have dispensed w;ith
the necessity of by a prior statute, then a subsequent statute dispensing with itretrospectively must be sustained".
Cons. Lira.

3 1/.

People v.

McDonald,

69 N.Y.

362.

In

accordance with this priinciple contracts of marriage/ which
by reason of some defect or informality were void/have been
legalized anI validated by subsequent statutes and such
statutes have been sanctioned by the court.

Tf for instance

the statute law required, at the time the marriage relation
was entered into/that the ceremony must be yei'formel by a

person ordained ayid settled in
and contrairy

to the law,

clcr.ymantn ta,,

it

1,1e work of the ministry;
performed

is

by an itinerating

such a marriage the legislature enacts

a law/makin;< valid all marria;'es performed by an ordinary
Such

minister.

law,

althou 7}' havin7 a

retroactive

effect is valid and in violation of no constitutional principle.
because

It is a law founded upon justice and sound reason,
its

effect

tion of the parties

is

merely

to carry out the ori;inal inten-

concerned.

And why should a rule of

law not be sanctioned which merely aids the parties, to
contract,

in ca;rrying out an honest and legitimate 2;urpose.

This principle was evolved by an able bench
Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conri.

in the case of

309, and was subsequently

sanctioned by a lon g line of well-considered, decisions in that
state.

It has been reyeatedly cited as a leading case

throughout the country, and has almost invariably been

.dopt-

ed by the different, courts.
Defective execut,ion of deeds and other contracts
can, constitutionally
acts.

In

be remedied by subsequent legislative

the case of Tate v. Shoultzpoos, 14. S&r,

a legislative act validating defective acknowledrments,

1

7,

which did riot silecify that the wife had been separately examined for the purpose of determinin" her willingness to

sign a conveyance with her husband, was sustaine].
firming acts

c1 aracter are not

of this

The legislatures have repeate~ly
and jurments of

corrnissioners,

peace, who were not
isting laws,

clear

merely
It

is

wrong;

is
the
to
right

a

an abuse

to

simply

in

of ter-ms

a

is
the

validating

a

seems
acts

not to do what he

as

tloat

this

rights;

sliT

different

upon no
ric]ht,
fair

but

and

just.

class of cases
for
,

it

is not

right

to

of form.

do a

When

only element

wanting

technical formality by

though a party

on the
is

infringe

it shall be

of some

then ex-

is peirfectly

any vested

and
one,Athe

bona fide

the

otlherwise

of a mere

cancellation
it

that

It
tyl-e

proceedin;

right

to

the

of

ad ceased under

of thlis

to contend

take advantagrle

legislature,
such

defect

a vested

transaction

of justices

divers reasons.

the consideration of veste

intended by

the

and for

provision nor divest

cure

involve

and

commissioned agreeable

th at remedial statutes

constitutional

at all uncommon.

remedied Iri'oceedings

or wTen their powers

circumstances

Ion-

groun]

that

cannot
1

obj;ct

e has a vested

in reality bound to

do,

and what

he has actually a~rreed to do.

Surely this class of levis-

lation/curing defective contracts, cannot be objected to on

the ground that it impairs an oblimation of a contract,

because tlie very object of such legislation is to make potent an inchoate ri-It under a contract, which

is nothing,

I

more tl'an completing an obligation.

Tle obligation exists

in fact from th-e time the contract is made and t! e legislative
act merely gives it existence in law as well as in fact.
The conclusion gleamed] from all te cases on this branch Uf
the law cannot be sta'ted better than in the lan:'uage of
Judge Cooley:

"Legislative acts validating invalid contracts

have been sustained when these acts ;o no further than to
bind a party by a contract which he has attempter to
enter into, but which, was invLlid by rer_.son of some personal
inability on his part to make, or through neglect of some
legal formality, or in consequence of some in-redient in the
contract forbiddin by law,

t!7e question tlhey suggest is

of policy and not of constitutional law".

one

Tn the case of

Blakely v. Farmers National Bank, 1/ Serg. & P. u4, a note
was given by

the bank after it

had forfeitel

its

charter

and a subsequent act of the legislature restored tIhe charter,

revived the corporation and legalized its past acts.
The court held tl e law to be constitutionai and the note
therefore
placing

valid.

So also,

of stamp-,s on instrurments

of this

from which

th ey have been

where not enforceabile whien unstam.iped,

omitted when execute.d,
is

in a statute autl-horizing the

character,

wether

the statute

requiring

the stamp

renders

the instrument

absolutely void or only witholds Tthe

remedy.

Harris v.

388.

Rutledgfe, l' Iowa,

at the time they are

entered into !.ay

binling by a retroactive
result

from some

or some stipulation
undertakes

law,

condition

be renderedvalid

when their

incoriorated

purposely

omitted,

Contracts void

invalidity

and

does not

within the contract,
which

the healing act

to supply.

AS AFFRICTITG

CORPORATTONS

Our corporation law is saturated with the principle
that a charter granted by a state creates a contract between
Lhe state and the corporators which the former cannot violate
nor impair.

This princille w3-ich was evolved in the

Dartmouth College case is now .upp.orted by a torrent of
authorities)and no court at this day will attempt to deny

that it

is

immoveably established.

As a charter to a

private corporation is a contract it is within the constitutional prohibition which prohibits the states from passing
a law which impairs the obligation of contracts.
Hence it

is beyond the power of the state to repeal or ma-

terially annul such a corporate c.arter, unless the power
of amendment and~mp-eal hawebeen expressly reserved, or
unless all the parties consent to the chang e.

All the

franchises, privileg'es, express and implied powers', necessary
and essential to carry out the corporate purposes are also
protected by the constitution.

But the fact that a char-

ter of incorp-oration is a contractand entitled to
constitutional protections,

does not prevent

all the

the state from

passing7 remedial and curative statutes correcting prior invalid proceedingTs of

a corporation.

has the same power to ratify

The legislatureg

and confirm an irregularly organ-

ized corporation as thly have to

create a new one.

So by an act confirming a consolidation between two railroad
companies.which was not binding when entered into~is valid.
Citing) Mitchell v. Reed,

49 Ill.

416.

Although the charters of stock corporations are
protected by the constitution to the same extent that other

contracts are,

they are not exernt from the operation of gen-

eral laws, imposing upon tl.em such additional duties as the
legislature may deem necessary for the better security
of persons and rrorerty,

and prescribinr- penalties for fail-

ure to comply with thieir requirments.

Yithin this cat-

egory of statutes are those that relate to the exercise of
callings w'ich endanger life,

limb or property.

This clasS

of statutes does not derend for t'heir validity upon any
privileges conferred by the grant of a franchise.
The farthest that the cases have gone on this subject,
is

to permit the legislature to regulate 1lIie carrying rates

of passengers and freight.

Laws of this kind are clearly

within the regulation of the police power of the state,
if

such laws require tlie or~erations of a cor'roration

and

to be

conducted in a manner different from that required by the
law as it existed when th-.e charter was granted there can be
no objection.
and it

A corporation is an artificial person

must be subject to the police regulations of a state

in the same manner and to the same extentin certain respects,
as a natural Yersonlwhen the safety and welfare of the
public

demand-s it

regardless of what mi7ht have been the

law when the act of incorporation was consummated.
stand upon a different foot-

Municipal corporations

ing than private or stock corporations.
corporations

are not contracts,

Charters of such

and are not p'rotected

by the constitutional prohibition a'Tiicable to contracts

like stock corporations are.

ViJeni a legislative ac;

is

in response to the petition of the inhabitants of a particular district, who ask for tl e construction of a municipal
government,

tle grantin7 of the prayer

is

not for their

recuniary benefit, nor does the state receive nor the inhabitants part with any consideration, express or implied.
The status of the individuals composing such corporations
is

not changed in

erty.

concerning

It is merely tl-e giving

municipal
by the

any respect

government

inviolability

restrictel

to

them.

or enlarged by

of certain functions of
And as

of contracts

tTeir private prop-

it

it

may be amendel,

it.

altered,

Such corporations are

mere creatures of the legislature from which

tion to make laws

not rrotected

the legislature without even con-

sulting the members composing

the powers they possess.

is

They have no

or regTulations

they derive all

ini}erent jurisdic-

of Aovernment.

Their

powers rest

grant

on a legislative

The same rower that

impliedly conferred.

corporate privileges p rescribes
formalities under which th-ey
and in

and must be exTiressly

or

creates these

the rules and declare.s the

shall be called into action,

granting them does not divest

itself,

of th

right)

at all times to modify or altogether abolish them in legislative

discretion.

AS APFECTING CRMIITAL LAWS.

Under the English constitution there has been froqunet instances where the government has found itself unable

to vindicate its peace and dignity~without a new law
iting

past acts,

rohib-

and prescribing 1-unisliments to meet

exegency of the case.

the

'ut this mode of legislation is

so expressly p<rohibited

by the federal

constitution,

that

in the United S tates the instances have been rare where there
has been any legislative intent to make crimes out of previous innocent acts.
al
are

The violations of this constitution-

prohibition have genei-ally been in
for the most part

the result

other respects,

of clumsy legislative

tents to make the law ar-ply to future criminal acts

and
in-

only.

The clause of the constitution prohiibiting

tiie

enactment of ex post facto laws first received a judicial
) Dallas, 261).

construction in the case of 7alder v. Bull,

prohibition referred only

was lcijd down that this

Here it

laws of a criminal

Judge Chase laid down the four fundamental

dicious

to determine ex post facto laws,
recognized
of this

by the courts

character.

enumerates:
done before,

"First,

Third,

every

a greater

tesTin,- t}he validity

innocent

of statutes

when done,

criminal;

and

Second, every law that aggravates

-reater

runishment

rules of evidence,
than the

it

law that

when committed.

that are today substantially

every law that makes an action,

whichi was

crime or makes

in

rules

Tl-ie following are the ones which he

punishes such action.
a

and ju-

and the celebrated

character;

to

than

changes

it

was when committed.

the punishment

and inflicts

than the law annexed to the crime
Fourth,

and receives

law required

at the

the legal

every law that alters
less or different

testimony

time of the commission of the

offense, in order to convict the offender".

These four

test rules are now firmly established, with the exception of
the last.

And upon this there has been conside'able con-

flict

in

the cases,

and it

is

still

of doubtful

validity.
diminisYhing

It is settled beyond a doubt that laws
the punishment or laws
Put

post facto.
in

difficulty
ing of this

changing procecure merely are not ex

tI e courts have met with not a

determiningwhat

rule.

is

little

punishment within the meanthoroughly

The question was

considered

by the courts in settling cases that arose from the late
rebellion.
states,

In the reconstruction of the southern

some of the new state constitutions or statutes

rrescribed a test oathi of previous

loyalty as -

irerequisite

to the exercise of privileFres of citizenship, or the carryThue takin- and

ing on of certain designated callings.
subscribing
a

of the 'test

condition precedent

oath was 7enerally made not only
to the exercise

or following the calling,

of the privileges,

but a failure

to comply was made

a disqualification of those already in possession of such
rights

and privileges.

These provisions were objected

to on the ground that they made an act lunishable which was
not so when committed.

The question ti-en arose whether

such disqualifications were punishments.
have generally held that laws depriving

The courts
one of the right

to pursue a lawful calling for some previous innocent act
was ex post facto because it was the infliction of a legal
lunishment for a past innocent act.

for

not a punishment,

one of the elective franchise is
the reason that votin7 is

Put merely to deprive

not an inherent right but simply

a Iprivilege subject to the regulation of the state.
The next difficult question that presents itself
in

this class of cases is: What changes of iunishment will
The rule laid down

be held to be an increase thereof?

by the N ew York Court of Appeals in Hartung v.
and Ratzky v.

People

}9 -N.Y. is

"That in

People,

Z->?U.Y.

any case where

reasonable men might deem a chang" to be an increase of
punishment
change

the ,-ourts will declare the law affecting such

ex post

has recently

facto".

The Supreme

established

the rule,

the diminution of punishment

Court of Missouri

"That

in

order to

effect

the new law must take away

some separable portion of the forme-' punishment".
These rules,

however,

are not safe discriminating tests

and the cases upon this subject seem to be decided largely
upon the particular

however,

circumstances

t}" at a law decreasing

of each.

It

is

clear

the time of imprisonment

or the amount of a fine would be a diminution of punishment,
but tlhe great difficulty arises w1 ere there has been a sub-

This is tl-e doubtful mar in.

stitution of' Tunishments.

Some laws cl~an-ing the mode of yunishment, havc been sustained, while others apl:arently of a simil :r character have
been condemned by the

Therefore,

courts.

rule concernin

down any distinguishing

" tThis

to try

to lay

class of cases

would be nothing more -han absurd presumption, under t]u
I1resent existing state of the law.
The same general laws of limitation that apply to
civil,causes of action are equally aprlicable in criminal
And changes

cases.

in criminal procedure are also held

to affect no substantial rirrlt of tI'e defendant, and are
A law c Tlanging the I:lace of trial to another co-bity

valid.

will govern the trial of Irevious offenses as well as those
A citizen has no rioJlt to demand

committed subsequently.
a trial

in

procedure.

a particular
Any

be made without
public,

court,

clanr7e

of r'rocedure

imlairing

mode of

or by any particular
is

the defendant's

valid

right

when it can
to a

speedy,

and efficacious trial, and without rendering it more

burdensome upon _him than it

was under the law as it

existed

when the crime was aller-eI to Thuve been comritted.
Statutes which give to the state a ,-rcater number of peremptory challenges 'ave been sustained.

Also changes in the

rpanner of sumnonin< jurors, and laws requiring a jury instead
of the court to assess damages are marc canjos in

l

'ocedure

andI do not affect any substantiai richt.

Thus we conclude a brief view of a branch of our
j ur isprudencel the,pecuiiarities of whiOh were created by our
constitution;

an-

viich has recived not a small portion

of the judicial consideration during an hiu-ndred years of
constitutional interpretation.

